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Abstract—A smart city involves critical infrastructure systems
that have been digitally enabled. Increasingly, many smart city
cyber-physical systems are becoming automated. The extent
of automation ranges from basic logic gates to sophisticated,
artificial intelligence (AI) that enables fully autonomous systems.
Because of modern society’s reliance on autonomous systems in
smart cities, it is crucial for them to operate in a safe manner;
otherwise, it is feasible for these systems to cause considerable
physical harm or even death. Because smart cities could involve
thousands of autonomous systems operating in concert in densely
populated areas, safety assurances are required. Challenges
abound to consistently manage the safety of such autonomous
systems due to their disparate developers, manufacturers, oper-
ators and users. A novel network and a sample of associated
network functions for autonomous systems is proposed that aims
to provide a baseline of safety for autonomous systems. This
is accomplished by establishing a custom-designed network for
autonomous systems that is separate from the Internet, and
can handle certain functions that enable safety through active
networking. Such a network design sits at the margins of the
end-to-end principle, which is warranted considering the safety
of autonomous systems is at stake as is argued in this paper.
Without a scalable safety strategy for autonomous systems as
proposed, assured autonomy in smart cities will remain elusive.
Index Terms—Smart City, Assured Autonomy, Safety, Au-
tonomous System, End-to-End Argument, Active Networking,
Cyber Physical System
I. INTRODUCTION
Considering the scale at which smart cities will employ
autonomous systems, safety assurances will be required. This
paper proposes an active network that could facilitate the safe
operation of autonomous systems in a smart city ecosystem.
The argument for active networking invokes an exception in
the end-to-end argument citing how performance enhance-
ments could justify functions at the network level. In this case
the performance enhancement is safety, which is a priority
considering it can reduce the risk of death caused by an
autonomous, cyber-physical system in a densely populated
smart city environment. For the sake of spurring discussion,
the paper proposes sample functions that could reside at a
low level of the stack in order to guarantee certain safety
parameters across disparate autonomous systems.
A. Situation
As population densities have increased in cities, there has
been an incremental toll on urban critical infrastructure’s
performance. To alleviate this burden by enabling efficiency
and cost-savings, there has been movement towards digitizing
urban systems by instrumenting critical infrastructure with em-
bedded systems and connecting these systems to the internet.
The digital instrumentation and connectivity of industrial sys-
tems is referred to as the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).
The subsequent connectivity of urban systems and services as
a result of the deployment of IIoT results in the establishment
of a ”Smart City”. An example of a smart city capability is
traffic demand management. To improve the traffic flow during
peak demand hours in a city, a combination of traffic sensors,
traffic lights, CCTV cameras and traditional traffic police
services could be leveraged to minimize congestion, thereby
reducing wait times, infrastructure wear and environmental
impact (e.g. air pollution).
The instrumentation of urban systems is not new, but the
mechanisms for controlling these IIoT systems are changing
rapidly. Originally, these IIoT systems may have employed
basic ladder logic to facilitate the control of their surroundings.
The cost of processors and memory on these IIoT devices has
dropped drastically which has enabled many new features for
the IIoT - one of which includes the ability to conduct complex
processing on the edge. One use case for edge processing
is using artificial intelligence (AI) to make control decisions.
Such artificial intelligence can vary from enacting AI planning
instructions to facilitating distributed deep learning processes.
B. Complication
Edge AI has accelerated the capabilities of autonomous,
cyber-physical systems. Smart cities are increasingly em-
ploying this technology for use cases such as autonomous
transportation and distributed energy generation and demand
management. Because the decision-making for these systems
are completed without human oversight, in real-time, there
is no room for error. For example, faulty communications
between a renewable energy system and a neighborhood’s
microgrid potentially caused by poor system integration could
result in a brown-out. Equally disconcerting is the failure of
an autonomous vehicle to perform as intended, resulting in a
traffic accident that perhaps causes physical harm or death to
riders.
Faults in autonomous systems as described above could be
a function of multiple issues. Because of their cyber-physical
nature, faults could be caused by mechanical failures. Mechan-
ical issues are largely avoidable through proper commissioning
and maintenance plans for the technology. More disconcerting
are digitally caused failures such as ones relating to faulty AI
logic or malicious actors via security vulnerabilities. These
digital faults are problematic because they are difficult to
troubleshoot, could remain undetected in the system for a
prolonged period and could cause catastrophic failures in the
autonomous system. Further, such digital issues could cause
cascading failures across multiple autonomous systems that
have logic that rely on each other - as is the case for renewable
energy systems.
Perhaps the most important distinction about autonomous
systems in smart cities is that because of their cyber-physical
nature, a premium is placed on the physical safety of the
agent. It is critical for the control of these systems to be
consistent and reliable in order to facilitate safety. Without
safety as a priority, these systems could ostensibly result in
human harm or death due to their cyber-physical operations.
This is especially important in smart cities where hundreds
or even thousands of autonomous systems are operating and
potentially interacting amidst densely populated urban centers.
This begs the question: how do we instill safety features in
every autonomous system across a given operating landscape
or ecosystem? Because of the diverse field of developers, man-
ufacturers, operators and users of such autonomous systems,
these safety parameters should be instantiated in the common
element across the agents - the network.
C. Proposal
The proposed Assured Autonomous Cyber-Physical Ecosys-
tem (AACE) network architecture will draw from other cus-
tom, use case-specific networks that employ active networking.
The ambition of AACE is to establish a baseline of safety
across all autonomous systems that reside on the network.
Such a baseline would enable public trust in the safety
of cyber-physical, autonomous systems that operate at scale
across a smart city.
II. PRIOR ART
Since the ubiquity of the Internet, there have been calls from
industry groups and various governments and their constituent
agencies for custom, use case specific networks that stand
alone from the global Internet. Generally, these calls have
been the result of specific needs that the Internet does not
fully address. This has taken various forms. For example, the
space industry is currently designing the ”space internet” to
facilitate communications across satellite systems in space [1].
Similarly, the government of Russia has set out to build its own
”unplugged”, sovereign internet [2]. The ambition with such
networks is that they would be developed with a particular
user group in mind and interact with the global Internet in
discreet ways - if at all. Nearly all instances are a reflection
of the need for greater application control within a network.
A. Network Architecture Design
The internet was designed using a set of design principles
called the end-to-end arguments [3]. The end-to-end arguments
dictate that ”functions placed at low levels of a system may
be redundant or of little value when compared with the
cost of providing them at that low level” [4]. The principle
continues to dictate that providing application functionality in
the network allocates unnecessary strain to all applications
that interact with the network - whether they make use
of the application functionality or not. It also argues that
because the network may not have as much information as
the application, the low level subsystem cannot perform as
efficiently compared with if similar requirements were in the
application layer [4].
Saltzer, Reed and Clark, the authors of the end-to-end ar-
gument, permit that there are exceptions to this rule of thumb.
They assert that low level functionality could become justified
as a performance enhancement [4]. A major consideration is
if the performance enhancement afforded by functionality at
the low level is worthwhile to all the devices that reside on the
network, despite additional overhead caused by the function.
This question has been grappled with by scholars discussing
the merits of active networking.
Bhattacharjee, Calvert and Segura describe an extension of
the end-to-end argument called ”active networking” which
rationalizes functionality in the network. They propose a
performance model to assess the benefits of functions residing
in-network versus in the application [5], [6]. They argue that
placing higher level functionality in the low levels of the
network is not contradictory to the end-to-end principle, rather
the principle merely qualifies a notional threshold of trade-
offs be met before designing functions in the network. For
example, there could be use cases where certain environmental
information is held within the network and timely use of such
information could enhance the services of the application.
They proceed to propose some functions that could be of
benefit across a class of systems on a network including: time
and place of congestion, global patterns across the network,
and the location of packet losses [5]. These classes of functions
are metadata that could have direct benefit to application
functionality. To serve such functions, it would be critical that
all applications could receive a benefit from these functions
in spite of any overhead required to serve them. The team
proceeded to calculate, using their model, a cost-benefit of
employing functions on the network versus the application
layer for reliable multicast and application-specific congestion
control. In both cases, the team determined that employing
active networks outperformed the end-to-end network imple-
mentation where functions reside on the application [5].
Research in active networks peaked in the mid 1990’s
amidst the DARPA Working Group on Active Networks [7].
An insight from Calvert, one of the participants of the DARPA
program, was that it is difficult to quantify benefits of active
networking; yet the benefit of improved manageability and
control of the network is widely cited [8]. The notion of
active networking improving the control of applications is also
reflected in a survey on active networking research [9]. The
survey team concludes there is a major mismatch between
the rate user requirements change and the status of network
infrastructure, which can be interpreted as a control issue.
They suggest that the future will entail protocol components
instead of stacks which are highly specialized to the features
of a given use case.
B. Active Networking in Action
Despite the design thinking behind active networks being
discussed in the 1990s, there seems to be little discussion
networks being implemented in this manner until much later.
Control continues to be a core theme for those that seek active
networks. For example, Russia’s quest to build the RUNET is
largely a function of their interest in having complete control
over their segment of the Internet. Their interest in control
is in the name of national security [10]. The RUNET has
been discussed for over a decade, but only recently has this
active network been tested ”successfully” where Russia claims
to have disconnected itself from the Internet on December
23, 2019 [11]. As part of this, specific control features were
tested such as the possibility of intercepting subscriber traf-
fic and revealing information about the subscriber, blocking
communication services” according to a state media document
published on December 5, 2019 [11]. Russia is not the first
country to work towards controlling their citizens’ interactions
with the Internet. Both Iran and China also have versions of
their own active networks to enforce control over their citizens
[12].
Active networks have also been discussed for specific
industry use cases in recent years. For example, the space
internet, while in many ways aims to mirror a ”horizontal”
infrastructure akin to the global Internet, intends to have
various architectural designs to serve different purposes -
namely, Earth Science Enterprise, Human Exploration and
Development in Space, and Space Science Enterprise [13]. The
variations of architecture to serve these different purposes are
to facilitate a customized level of application control for their
given use case.
Over the past decade, the energy industry has also called
for their own network for energy distribution. In these cases
scholars have designed energy routers to facilitate the flow
and delivery of energy through distributed means [14]. Control
issues are cited as a barrier to the implementation of distributed
generation [15]. Considering the importance of energy distri-
bution as critical infrastructure, it is essential for operators
to have control over the applications that facilitate energy
delivery.
C. Safe Cyber-Physical Systems
Control is a major theme across network architectures
that present exceptions to the end-to-end principle. Saltzer,
Reed and Clark posited that low level network functionality
could be justified for performance enhancement, which may
well include improved control. Considering the safety of
autonomous, cyber-physical systems is primarily a control
issue, active networking could prove useful to facilitate safety
of these systems. Further, Bhattacharjee, Calvert and Segura
cost/benefit calculations for active networking suggested that
functions that help to orient an application in relation to its
environment (such as the location of congestion) is better
situated in the network than in the application [5]. Autonomous
cyber-physical systems’ safe use is generally reliant on the
system’s ability to orient itself to its surroundings, which also
points towards the use of active networking to enable safety of
these systems. Perhaps the most compelling reason to consider
the exception to the end-to-end principle for an autonomous
systems network is because low level functionality enables
safety at the expense of performance, which is certainly
justifiable when lives may be at stake.
Leveson, a long-established expert in safe software systems,
asserts that safety issues arise because of the interactions
across ”unfailed” components [16]. She describes how systems
cannot be modeled or analyzed for safety in isolation of other
interacting systems and that testing, simulation and standard
formal verification is ineffective at assessing a system’s safety.
While such tests may be ineffective to assess safety on
individual systems, perhaps safety is better assessed at the
system ecosystem or network level. This could especially be
worthwhile to assess if there is in fact active networking in
place to ensure the interactions across systems are safe. In the
subsequent section, we propose functionality that belongs in
the autonomous system’s network to enable safety.
III. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Rather than the applications themselves be designed for
safety, it will be important to provide guarantees that the
entire ecosystem of applications is indeed safe by embedding
safety parameters in the network. Employing active network-
ing would help to facilitate this on a specialized AACE. Such
an architectural design is uniquely applicable to when there are
many autonomous systems deployed at once. A smart city is
an example for when a diverse group of autonomous systems
will perform at scale. A rationale for separating autonomous
systems from the Internet is provided below. Then, sample
functions and their associated concepts for AACE are pro-
posed that could enable the safety of autonomous systems
at scale. At this time, it is unclear if these are the right
functions to include in an active network. It is also not yet
known what the overhead cost and relative benefit for each
of these sample functions may be. These sample functions
are described primarily for the sake of discussion. Functions
that will be discussed include: demand management, proximal
insight, reliable multicast, conflict detection and controlled
failure. A rationale for each function’s inclusion is included
below.
A. A Separate Network
There are three principal reasons why a separate network
for AACE is warranted. First, air-gapping autonomous systems
from the global Internet could increase the work-factor of
bad actors seeking to cause harm to these systems. While
not foolproof by any means as demonstrated in previous
successful attacks [17], air-gapping critical functions could
increase the work-factor of a would-be attacker that intends to
corrupt the safety of an autonomous system. Second, certain
cyber-physical systems are very sensitive to errant network
activity because they are highly calibrated and/or delicate.
For example, there are anecdotal reports that systems like
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) controllers
(employed for long-range industrial control) break during pen-
etration testing or high network activity periods. Considering
autonomous systems would also be highly calibrated consider-
ing their sophistication, it is feasible for errant network activity
over the Internet to cause disruptions, thereby compromising
system safety. Finally, establishing a new and separate network
for autonomous systems could provide the active networking
functions described below.
B. Demand Management
A given smart city will ostensibly have hundreds of thou-
sands, if not millions of sensors and associated controllers
across the urban environment. Assuming each cyber-physical,
autonomous system has it’s own intranet or communication
system like a CANbus and the IIoT components of a given
autonomous system interact with other autonomous systems
in a unified way, there are still likely to be thousands of
autonomous systems that need to interact across an ecosystem
at any time. Because of this scale of operations, it will be
important for the systems to have realistic expectations of
communication latency, such that it can modulate its decision-
making speed accordingly.
For example, an autonomous vehicle may assume that it
will receive information from a dog collar about its physical
location in the middle of the road during a green light in
real-time. The autonomous vehicle may allow for a 2-second
reaction time window to receive new emergency location data
so that it can act on this information. However, in this hypo-
thetical situation, there are so many devices on the network
at a certain time that there is a 3-second delay across the
network from when the dog collar’s location state is captured
to when it is received by the vehicle. In such a scenario, it
would be critical for the vehicle to know about this delay and
account for its allowable reaction-time window accordingly
(by slowing down). If the network is equipped with a demand
management function like this, autonomous systems could be
better equipped to handle situations that could compromise
safety due to latency.
C. Proximal Insight
Because all systems will need to interact with each other
in some capacity, each should be aware of the state of the
most proximal autonomous systems at any given time. More
specifically, the network should be able to serve each system
with information regarding the latest request of proximal
systems. Such requests could provide insight to changes in
physical course, data load requirements of the network or
emergency signals being emitted by local systems.
For example, it could be highly valuable for a network
to consistently provide all autonomous systems with data
concerning other systems in distress. This could provide both
a mechanism that supports autonomous system resilience
facilitated by the network and a mechanism for warnings about
immediate safety threats to given autonomous systems that are
part of the ecosystem.
D. Reliable Multicast
Reliable delivery of data to all necessary systems will
be crucial for the safety of autonomous devices. Generally,
data loss is common and accepted across many networking
protocols. This is especially true for point to multi-point data
delivery. The safety of autonomous systems will be reliant on
state communication from other autonomous systems so that
any given system can orient itself in relation to the rest of the
ecosystem. For this reason, it will be unacceptable for data to
not reach any node across the network.
For example, if a drone plans to land in a given location,
to avoid collisions, it will be critical to deliver its coordinates
out to other systems. Should only a limited number of systems
receive the notification of landing from the drone, there is an
increase in the likelihood that a collision occurs. Therefore,
systems need to be assured that all applications will reliably
receive data delivered. If data is not reliable received, systems
should be notified accordingly so that they can make decisions
about how to handle the communication failure accordingly.
E. Conflict Detection
Considering the scale at which autonomous systems will
operate in a smart city, it is inevitable that conflicting com-
mands will be issued to various systems which may lead
to a safety issue. Rather than rely on the application to
catch discrepancies across commands, it would be valuable
for meta-level conflict detection to occur on the network.
The network could help flag conflicting information for the
systems and provide validation to the command as unique,
rather than waiting until the conflicting logic is processed in
the application.
For example, imagine a scenario where a smart parking
application dictates that the same space is available to two
different vehicles at the same time. Both vehicles then proceed
to take action towards securing the open spot. It would be
valuable for the network to understand the constraints of the
system environment and by using planning logic conclude that
it is impossible for both vehicles to park in the same spot
despite both taking actions to secure the space. The network
could proceed to signal to one of the vehicles that a conflict
was detected and therefore the spot is no longer available. Such
an action may not only spare the possibility of a collision.
F. Controlled Failure
Perhaps one of the most useful safety features of an active
network for a smart city ecosystem would be to enable safe
failures of the autonomous systems on the network. There
could be infinite possibilities for the interaction of systems
to cause unsafe conditions. Rather than having a network
that can protect against all of these potential safety hazards,
it would be valuable for the network to allow for the safe
and controlled failure of autonomous systems. One way that a
network could perhaps do this is through a distributed voting
mechanism where each application is requested by the network
to vote on the safety of each system present. Should all nodes
return with consensus regarding a bad actor node, the network
would be able to eject the ”bad actor” from the network
in a controlled way. A mechanism as described would help
to purge the network from potentially hazardous agents and
continuously prune the network. When the network determines
a node should be decommissioned, it is first quarantined and
allowed to complete its most recent command as long as it
does not impact other nodes on the network. The application
is simultaneously notified by the network that it will be cut
off and should plan for a safe dismount accordingly. Equally,
any autonomous system that was communicating with the
bad actor would also be notified that the bad actor will be
decommissioned.
An example of this could involve a smart street light that
is continuously flashing and simultaneously pinging nearby
autonomous systems about their error unnecessarily, causing
packet flooding across the network. The street light could be
voted out of the network by the other nodes. Th network
would first notify the smart street light of the issue as well
as notify all systems that are communicating with the street
light and vice versa that the system’s communications will be
decommissioned. Then the network will cease communication
of signals that the light is disseminating to other systems.
Establishing an integrity check through a voting mechanism
would provide increased reliability and trust across the net-
work.
IV. DISCUSSION
Smart cities will ultimately rely on autonomous systems
to facilitate critical infrastructure operations, which comes
with considerable benefits. Cyber-physical, autonomous sys-
tems could yield economic efficiencies, reduce environmental
impact and increase convenience for citizens. However, safety
risks are sure to accompany these autonomous systems.
Safety has been addressed for autonomous systems before
by establishing processes for ensuring safety in systems at
the software or process level [18]–[20]. While these means
for facilitating safety could be highly effective for individual
systems, smart cities will realize a scale of operations of
autonomous systems not previously expected. This warrants
a safety enforcement mechanism that could be consistent
across all systems regardless of their function or how they
were developed. Employing network-level safety functions
will ensure that there is a scalable way to implement a baseline
level of safety across all autonomous systems. There are likely
to be cost trade-offs with employing functions at this low level,
but this is justified by the universal enhancement of safety
and improved control over the otherwise potentially dangerous
systems.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper intends to provide a starting point for discussion
about active networking for autonomous systems and functions
that should be built into AACE. Considerable research is still
needed to determine which are the most critical functions
required at the network level of a smart city ecosystem to
ensure safety across all autonomous devices. Then, evaluating
the technical feasibility of implementing these functions on
the network level is required. Also, a cost/benefit calculation
should be completed to evaluate if the function should indeed
be at a low level of the stack.
As autonomous systems become ubiquitous and their op-
erations scale accordingly, there will be a vital need for
reliable control to ensure safety and reduce the risk of death
by AI-enabled autonomous, cyber-physical systems. Not only
must these systems operate in a safe way themselves, but
their interactions with other systems must also be assuredly
safe at scale. Therefore, establishing safety controls at the
lowest common denominator across all interacting autonomous
systems - the network, could provide considerable benefits
given the diversity of systems, developers, manufacturers,
operators and users that could otherwise lead to safety failures.
Creating safety assurances by embedding certain functions
in the network can take us a step closer to legions of safe,
autonomous cyber-physical systems for future smart cities.
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